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Three studies investigated how subliminally primed thoughts of an agent prior to action 
can affect ascriptions of authorship for that action. Participants competed against a computer 
program to remove words from a computer screen. Participants reported greater feelings of 
authorship when primed with first person singular pronouns, and lower feelings of authorship 
when primed with “computer.” We also investigated whether authorship feelings could be 
affected by priming subjects with a supernatural agent (i.e., God). Feelings of authorship 
decreased when participants were primed with God, but only among believers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 When you do something, how do you know you’re the one who did it? Normally, this 
doesn’t seem like much of a mystery, because you can feel yourself doing things and appreciate 
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the operation of your physical body. But what happens when the self is not the only agent that 
might be responsible for the body’s actions? At times, agents other than the self are very 
plausible causes for actions, such as when your computer crashes and it is not clear whether you 
pressed an inappropriate button or whether the computer is to blame. In addition, at least for 
some people, there may be non-self agents present in a mere psychological sense, potential 
causal forces that are believed to exist and guide action—agents such as spirits, angels, Satan, 
God, or even the inner voices that accompany delusional states. How do people sort out the 
causes of their own actions when they believe in such agents? These studies explored the idea 
that the attribution of authorship for action to self might be influenced by the subliminal priming 
of particular agents, and that the influence of such priming might depend on the person’s beliefs 
in the agent. 
Attribution of Authorship 
 The feeling that the self is the author of an action is derived in part from basic 
physiological systems of the body. One knows one is doing something by virtue of interoceptive 
sensations of the body’s movement (Craig, 2003) that occur both before action (Frith, 
Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000) and after action (Gandevia & Burke, 1992). Such bodily 
feedforward and feedback systems are supplemented by visual and auditory feedback, as we can 
often see and hear ourselves act. However, these sensory indicators of authorship for action are 
often overridden by a variety of social and contextual variables that can drive attributions quite 
independently of direct sensation (Wegner, 2002; Wegner & Sparrow, 2004). In the case of 
actions that do not have obvious bodily sensations, or that are so distant from their bodily 
wellsprings as to be difficult to trace, the experience of authoring the action may depend not on 
sensation, but on processing causal information and arriving at an attribution judgment (Heider, 
1958; Kelley, 1972; Jones & Davis, 1965; Gilbert, 1997). 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
Agent Priming  4 
An early theory of such attribution proposed by Ziehen (1899) held that thinking of self 
before action yields the experience of own agency. He remarked that “...we finally come to 
regard the ego-idea as the cause of our actions because of its very frequent appearance in the 
series of ideas preceding each action. It is almost always represented several times among the 
ideas preceding the final movement. But the idea of the relation of causality is an empirical 
element that always appears when two successive ideas are very closely associated” (Ziehen, 
1899, p. 296). The hypothesis that thoughts of self may incline people to interpret actions as their 
own was later noted by Michotte (1963), and was developed yet more fully in the objective self 
awareness theory of responsibility attribution (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Duval & Silvia, 2001).  
Research on attention and causal attribution has shown that people who are led to attend 
to themselves become more likely to attribute responsibility to self for causally ambiguous 
events (Duval, Duval, & Neely, 1979; Duval & Wicklund, 1973), although not always in the case 
of negative events (Federoff & Harvey, 1976). More generally, when attention is drawn to any 
social entity—self, other, or group—that entity becomes likely to draw attributions of causation 
and responsibility (Arkin & Duval, 1975; Lassiter, Geers, Munhall, Ploutz-Snyder, & 
Breitenbecher, 2002; McArthur & Post, 1977; Storms, 1973; Taylor & Fiske, 1978; Wegner & 
Giuliano, 1982). This view of attribution suggests why actors more often view their behavior as 
caused by situations, whereas observers of those actors view the same behavior as caused by the 
actors’ dispositions—the difference may occur in part because actors are attending to situations 
and observers are attending to the actor (Jones & Nisbett, 1972).  
The attentional view of causal attribution also solves an important problem in how 
agency judgments are made. The attention theory suggests that prior thought about an agent or 
cause creates a frame for cause perception, a general tendency for agency to be ascribed to the 
attended agent. Such a frame or set can explain why it is that attributions of agency to self are 
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often very fluid and perfunctory (e.g., Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005), occurring with a rapidity 
that suggests automatic processing (e.g., Taylor & Fiske, 1978) rather than a thorough 
information search (e.g., Kelley, 1968). If every event in the world required a full analysis of 
possible agents, after all, quick judgments of own agency would seem unlikely. For example, the 
simple act of going the kitchen for a midnight snack could throw a person into an attributional 
crisis if one had to consider the multiple possibilities that self is doing this, or that others present 
are eliciting the action, or perhaps even that absent others or supernatural agents such as God are 
prompting the action. The person would seldom figure out who did it before the snack was all 
gone. Because people also make rapid authorship judgments not only for actions but for their 
own thoughts—and thoughts are only misattributed to non-self agents in psychopathology or in 
unusual circumstances (Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; Graham & Stephens, 1994)—it 
seems there must be a mental system that regularly guides attributions of agency toward a 
current default agent.  
Past research on causal attribution for own actions has focused on situational variables 
that influence attention, such as point of view (e.g., Storms, 1973; Taylor & Fiske, 1978). The 
default agent for own action must be determined, however, by mental processes that operate 
without such sensory guidance—or we would be mystified about who is doing our thinking and 
behaving each time we awake in the dark of night. The system of mind underlying the 
experience of authorship for our own actions seems likely to operate through a cognitive process 
that “keeps in mind” a current likely agent for action. This process should be susceptible to 
associative priming of information that serves to remind the person of a particular agent. Such 
priming could even ensue from subliminal sources, as conscious attention can be guided readily 
by unconscious primes (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Strahan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2002). Self-
attributions of authorship may be driven, in short, by an unconscious authorship processing 
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system (Wegner & Sparrow, 2004) that can be biased regarding attributions to particular default 
agents by associative priming. 
Such automatic, associative priming will generally have direct effects on perceived 
authorship, in that increased accessibility of an agent will lead to enhanced attribution to that 
agent. If the self is more accessible, the possibility that an action is ascribed to self increases. 
Likewise, if another external agent is accessible, attributions to the self become less likely. For 
instance, if the concept of “computer” is primed, a sudden computer failure during a routine 
maintenance would likely be attributed to the computer itself, rather than to the technician 
working it. Both the attention/attribution model and our authorship processing view are able to 
explain such direct effects. 
However, an important virtue of the authorship processing view is that it makes 
predictions that do not follow easily from a simple attention/attribution model. The 
attention/attribution model predicts inflexibly that increased attention to or priming of any agent 
would enhance attribution to that agent, whereas the authorship processing view opens a second 
possibility based on the assumption that people always keep in mind a default agent (often the 
self): A person might think of another agent alternatively as a rival for authorship, leading to less 
attributed agency to the default agent. For example, priming the concept of “God” may decrease 
experienced authorship for behavior among believers, because it rivals with the default concept 
of “self” as an author. 
Self versus Other Agents 
The belief that agents other than self might influence actions of the body is common in 
many cultures. Polls indicate that upwards of 95% of people in the USA profess a belief in God 
or a universal spirit (Bishop, 1999), and many believers worldwide ascribe authorship to God for 
all things (Boyer, 2001). It is common, too, for people to ascribe their creative insights (“Eureka 
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experiences”) to supernatural agents (Ghiselin, 1952). Young children are also often adept at 
ascribing events to culturally-sanctioned imaginary agents of other kinds, such as Santa or the 
Tooth Fairy (Woolley, 2000), and some have imaginary friends whom they feel influence their 
actions (Taylor, 1999). Some individuals with schizophrenia may ascribe actions, thoughts, or 
voices to imagined agents inside or outside themselves (Frith, 1994). And of course, there are a 
wide range of occult beliefs involving spirit agents, such as beliefs in trance channeling (Brown, 
1997) and spirit possession (Bourguignon, 1976). Humans seem to live in a world in which 
potentially many non-self agents might potentially be seen as controlling the body (Guthrie, 
1993). 
It is remarkable that people should be so willing to make attributions to agents that they 
do not physically encounter, and who leave little evidence of their actions (or their existence). 
Guthrie (1993) argues that the tendency to anthropomorphize is responsible for religious beliefs; 
we attribute agency to supernatural beings and develop religious beliefs around these agents. 
People possess a readiness to detect agents (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Heider 1958; Heider & Simmel 
1944), an advantage because it allows them to quickly identify potential threats, mates, and 
helpers. Most people with religious beliefs never see the gods or spirits they believe in. They 
expect to see the work of supernatural agents in everyday events, and so they do.  
There may be a connection between the ability to perceive intentional external agents and 
religious thought (Barrett, 2000). Boyer (2003) suggests that religious concepts often revolve 
around intentional agents that one does not physically encounter, such as ghosts, spirits, and 
gods, and that this is an extension of the human ability to run off-line interactions with imagined 
agents (Povinelli & Preuss, 1995; Scott et al. 1999). Bering (2002) suggests that people turn to 
intentional forces as a way of making sense of life events. Impactful events are often seen as 
some agent’s attempt to communicate with a person, and to teach that person important life 
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lessons (e.g., I broke my legs so that I would value life more). Gilbert, Brown, Pinel, and Wilson 
(2000) found that people seek external agents to explain fortunate events. People were found to 
ascribe agency to an external force when things worked out in their favor, and to attribute 
characteristics of benevolence and insight to that external agent. The agents a person might 
conceivably hold responsible for an event, in short, might include not only self and other real 
people or physical objects—but also could include supernatural agents. 
The assignment of authorship to agents, both self and nonself, has been viewed in prior 
theory as an attribution problem. Spilka, Shaver, and Kirkpatrick (1985) proposed that the 
availability of thoughts of God would influence whether believers would make either secular or 
religious attributions for events. This hypothesis resembles the attention theory of attribution, in 
that it suggests that the salience of thoughts of God should influence attributions of agency. 
Although the hypothesis has been evaluated in some studies, research has not revealed consistent 
effects of availability—finding instead a general bias toward attributions to God for positive as 
opposed to negative events (Lupfer, DePaola, Brock, & Clement, 1994). We contend  that 
attributions to God do not follow directly from mere attention or salience, but from more the 
complex processes of authorship processing. It could be that this inconsistency derives from 
variations in the degree to which God as an agent is seen as a causal alternative to self as agent. 
For instance, attributions to God only make sense if the person making the attributions perceives 
God as a plausible causal agent. Therefore, believers who are exposed to thoughts of God might 
attribute their own actions to an external source because God becomes a salient alternative cause 
(Kelley, 1972), whereas this should not be the case for nonbelievers.  
The study of the attribution of agency to self when people have been led through 
subliminal primes to think of self or of God, then, provides a context for understanding how 
authorship processing follows from different views of how internal and external agents interact. 
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The Present Research 
 Our experiments examined the influence of subliminal priming of agents on perceptions 
of the authorship of action. We designed a paradigm in which the authorship of a large number 
of simple actions was ambiguous. Participants competed against a computer program to remove 
words from the screen faster than the computer did, and on each trial judged whether they had 
successfully beat the computer to remove the word. Just before each word was presented, 
however, participants were subliminally primed with a word relating to self, another agent, or a 
control word. Thus, immediately before the act, the person was thinking about either self or 
another agent. The initial expectation was that priming of self-related words would lead to 
ascription of agency to self, whereas priming of words suggesting other agents would reduce 
ascription of agency to self. 
It should be noted that we primed agents subliminally for two reasons. First, as said 
before, we believe authorship processing relies on the mere accessibility of agents, and does not 
require conscious awareness. Subliminal priming has been shown to affect judgments in a variety 
of different domains (for a review see Dijksterhuis, Aarts & Smith, 2005), including judgments 
about the self. For example, Dijksterhuis (2004) investigated how implicit self-esteem could be 
improved by subliminal association of the self and positive primes. It was found that when self 
words were paired subliminally with positive words, participants had higher implicit self-esteem, 
as measured by their preference for letters in their own name. Subliminal priming in the present 
studies was used as a way of enhancing the accessibility of thoughts relevant to specific agents 
(cf. Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; Wegner & Smart, 1997). The second reason we used subliminal 
priming is that supraliminal priming may render the task odd for participants. Indeed, 
participants may become suspicious if they see different potential agents before each trial.  
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 The experiments began with a focus on natural agents: Self (Experiment 1), and the 
computer (Experiment 2). Then, we turned to the analysis of subliminal influences of priming 
with thoughts of God. We examined how subliminal priming of God would impact authorship 
judgments of those who believed or did not believe in God (Experiment 3).  
Experiment 1: Self Primes 
Method 
 Participants. Fifteen undergraduate students (11 women and 4 men) from the Radboud 
University Nijmegen participated in the experiment. They received Dfl. 5 (about 2.5 US dollars) 
in return.  
Instructions. It was explained that participants had to do a lexical decision task. A series 
of letter strings would appear on the screen and for each of these letter strings participants had to 
decide as quickly as possible whether the string was a word or a nonword. They were asked to 
decide by pressing a “word” key (A) or a “nonword” key (6). Pressing a key removed the letter 
string from the screen. It was explained to participants that the computer could remove the letter 
string before they had responded so an additional task was to beat the computer.  
 Measures and stimuli. Participants completed 72 lexical decision trials and 12 practice 
trials. Each trial included a 250 millisecond premask (XXXXXX), a 17 millisecond prime, a 50 
millisecond postmask (XXXXXX), and the target letter string. In half the trials, the target word 
was a random letter string (e.g., “gewws”). In the remaining half, the target word was a short, 
medium, or high frequency, word (bike, chair, etc.). In the experimental Self-prime trials, the 
prime “ik” (I in Dutch) and “mij” (me) were each used 18 times. The 36 control primes all 
contained the prime “de” (the). The practice trials did not have a prime. All primes were evenly 
divided over the targets so that half of the experimental primes had a nonword as a target 
whereas the other half had a word as a target.  
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 The computer was programmed to remove the letter string from the screen after 
participants had pressed the word/no word key, or at a maximum word time. This maximum time 
varied. It was programmed to be 450, 500, 550, 600, 650, or 700 ms, each used on 12 trials and 
on 2 practice trials. The range of maximum word times varied because it allowed for more 
individual differences in mean response time, and in addition it prevented subjects from judging 
responsibility just by some timing heuristic for when the word was removed.  
 As a measure of feeling of authorship, subjects were asked to decide whether it was they 
themselves or the computer that was responsible for the removal of the letter string following 
each trial (“Was it you or was it the computer?”). Responses were made on a six-point scale (1 = 
I’m sure it was me, 2 = I think it was me, 3 = If I would have to guess I’d say it was me, 4 = If I 
would have to guess I’d say it was the computer, 5 = I think it was the computer, 6 = I’m sure it 
was the computer). The practice trials were presented immediately before the actual task to give 
participants a feel for the task. 
Results and Discussion 
Response times. There were no differences in response time for different primes (M= 487 
ms.). Also, the percentage of trials where participants did indeed beat the computer (80.9 %) did 
not differ between different primes.  
Feelings of authorship. Reported feelings of authorship were recoded so that higher 
scores indicated greater feelings of own authorship. The mean overall feeling of authorship was 
calculated for the word and the nonword trials, and for the experimental and the control prime. 
These means were subjected to a within-subjects analysis of variance. Feeling of authorship was 
indeed higher after Self primes (M = 3.83, SD = .68) than after control primes (M = 3.64, SD = 
.74), F(1,14) = 5.02, p < .05, η2 =.21.  
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Experiment 2: Computer Primes 
In Experiment 1 authorship ascriptions to the self increased following priming with the 
self, which provides evidence that agent-relevant thoughts act as cues in authorship processing. 
As a follow-up, we examined whether feelings of authorship could also be influenced by 
thoughts of external agents – one that might also be responsible. In Experiment 2 we tested 
whether feelings of authorship might decrease after thoughts of an external agent. As in 
Experiment 1, participants performed lexical decision tasks on a computer. Because the 
competitor in this task was the computer, we primed subjects with thoughts of the computer just 
before action. We expected that thoughts of the computer would result in greater attributions of 
authorship to the computer, and decreased attributions to the self.  
Method 
Participants. Thirty people (19 women and 11 men) were recruited through 
advertisements in the Psychology Department at Harvard University. Volunteers received 
payment of five dollars for participation.  
Procedure. Much of the procedure in Experiment 2 was the same as Experiment 1. 
Participants were instructed to press the “word” key (E) when the letter string was a word, and 
the “not word” key (O) when it was a nonword. These keys were labeled for participants. 
Subjects completed a total of 112 lexical decision trials and 4 practice trials. Each trial included a 
250 millisecond premask (XXXXXX), 15 milliseconds exposure to the prime, 50 millisecond 
postmask (XXXXXX), and the target letter string. In half the trials the letter string was a word, 
in half the trials the letter string was a nonword. The prime “Computer” was used on 56 trials. 
Two different control primes were each used in 28 trials; the word “Broccoli,” and a series of 
lowercase X’s (“xxxxxx”.) We opted to use lowercase X’s to maintain the flickering effect that 
was seen on the other trials. As in Experiment 1, the computer removed the target letter string if 
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the subject pressed the word/not word key, or at the maximum word time, whichever came first. 
The maximum word times were programmed to be 450, 500, 550, 600, 650, 700 or 750 ms, each 
used on 16 trials. Order of trials was generated randomly. The target words and nonwords were 
selected randomly from a list for each trial. As an awareness check, subjects were asked at the 
end of the study whether they saw any words appear on the computer screen before the 
appearance of the target words.  
Results and Discussion 
Response times. There were no differences in response time for different primes (M = 500 
ms.). Also, the percentage of trials where participants did indeed beat the computer (63.4%) did 
not differ between different primes. No subjects reported that they could detect the subliminal 
primes before the appearance of the target words.  
Feelings of authorship. Reported feelings of authorship were recoded so that higher 
scores indicated greater feelings of own authorship. The mean overall feeling of authorship was 
calculated for all trials, and for each specific prime. There was an overall difference among the 
three primes on feelings of authorship, F(2, 28) = 5.13, p <.05, η2 = .27. Ratings of authorship 
did not differ between the two control primes, F(1, 29) = .62, ns, and so the control trials were 
collapsed together. Supporting our hypothesis, feelings of authorship decreased when subjects 
were primed with “Computer” (M = 3.87, SD = .76) as compared with control primes (M = 4.05, 
SD = .89, F(1, 29) = 7.89, p < .01, η2 = .21).  
Experiment 3: God Primes 
 In Experiment 2 we found that priming thoughts of a competing agent prior to an action 
decreased attributions to the self and increased attributions to the competitor. Together with 
Experiment 1, this provides evidence that agent relevant thoughts influence authorship 
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processing such that attributions are consistent with the agent relevant thoughts one has before 
action.  
In the following experiment, we were interested in whether thoughts of supernatural 
agents might also affect authorship processing. God is an external agent, and so thoughts one has 
about God before action should decrease attributions to the self for that action. As argued in the 
Introduction, our authorship processing view entails that people will have a default agent 
accessible (generally self) and priming a potential rival agent will reduce experienced authorship. 
It is important to note that this does not necessarily have to coincide with explicit awareness of 
increased agency for this rival agent. In our computer task, which is the same as in Experiments 
1 and 2, we will not ask participants whether it was them or God who took the word from the 
screen. The suggestion of such as explicit attribution to God would be preposterous for almost all 
people. Instead, we ask participants, as we did in the earlier studies, whether it was them or the 
computer. Given that the self is the default agent in the paradigm we used (the agency scores are 
generally leaning towards the “self” end of the scale) and assuming that God is seen as a 
plausible rival to the self (and not to a computer), we predict that priming God will reduce 
authorship.  
However, authorship attributions can only be made to agents that are capable of creating 
the action. If a person does not believe God to be a capable agent, she will not alter her 
attributions based on thoughts about God. In conclusion, Experiment 3 tested two hypotheses: 
First, that priming participants with the word “God” would decrease attributions made to the self. 
Secondly, that this effect is moderated by belief in God, with differences in attributions to the 
self occurring only among believers.  
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Method 
Participants. Fifty-five undergraduate students (41 women and 14 men) from the 
Radboud University Nijmegen participated in the experiment. They received Dfl. 5 (about 2.5 
US dollars) in return.  
 Measures and stimuli. The same instructions and procedure from Experiment 1 were 
used. Participants completed 72 lexical decision trials and 12 practice trials. In the 36 
experimental God-prime trials, the prime “God” was used. The 36 control primes all contained 
the prime “de” (the). The practice trials did not have a prime. All primes were evenly divided 
over the targets so that half of the experimental primes had a nonword as a target whereas the 
other half had a word as a target.  
 At the very end of the experimental session we asked participants whether they believed 
in God. The experimental session contained other experiments that were administered between 
the current experiment the question about belief in God, so that the question about belief was 
asked 35-45 minutes after participants performed the main task . We simply asked them “Do you 
believe in God?” and they were requested to either press a “yes” key or a “no” key. Twenty 
participants indicated they did believe in God, whereas 35 indicated that they did not. 
Results and Discussion 
Response times. There were no differences in response time for different primes (M= 492 
ms.). Also, the percentage of trials where participants did indeed beat the computer (80.1 %) did 
not differ between different primes or between believers and non-believers.   
Feelings of authorship. The mean overall feeling of authorship was calculated for the 
experimental God and the control prime. These means were subjected to a 2 (Belief in God: Yes 
versus No) x 2 (Prime: God versus Control) mixed analysis of variance. The main effect for 
Belief was significant, F(1, 53) = 4.45, p < .05, η2 = .08, however, this effect was qualified by 
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the two-way interaction, F(1, 53) = 5.49, p < .05, η2 = .10. As expected, participants indicated 
less authorship after being primed with God, but this effect was only obtained for believers. 
Compared to authorship after control primes, believers experienced less authorship after God 
primes, F(1, 53) = 4.14, p < .05, η2 = .07. Furthermore, for the non-believers the control prime 
and God prime conditions did not differ on authorship, F(1, 53) = 1.43, ns. Means are shown in 
Table 1. 
The results of Experiment 3 supported our predictions. Among believers, people felt 
decreased authorship when primed with God. This was not so for non-believers, who were 
unaffected by the God prime.  
It should be noted that we assessed whether participants believed at the end of the 
experiment. We did this because we did not want to draw attention to belief in God prior to the 
computer task in which we subliminally primed God. However, one could argue that the 
computer task may have affected the answers participants gave on the belief question. This is 
unlikely though. First, the priming of God was subliminal and therefore very subtle. Indeed, 
participants were unaware of the prime. Second, we addressed the belief question only after a 35-
45 minute interval.  
General Discussion 
The results of these studies provide evidence that subliminally primed thoughts about 
particular agents before an action impact the ascription of authorship for that action. In 
Experiment 1, subliminal primes of the self that were given before an action increased the 
personal feeling of authorship for that action. In Experiment 2, the feeling of authorship 
decreased after subjects were subliminally primed with the computer, an agent also capable of 
performing the target action. In Experiment 3, we found that feeling of authorship decreased 
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when people were subliminally primed with God, a supernatural agent who could perform the 
target action. However, this was only the case for people who believe in God; nonbelievers did 
not differ in their feeling of authorship between primes.  
There are several issues that should be addressed in the interpretation of these results. As 
we mentioned before, one issue concerns the possibility that the results obtained in Experiments 
1 and 2 reflect a semantic priming effect (Neely, 1991) rather than an agent priming effect. 
Priming subjects with the word “computer” or the word “Me” might affect their preferences for 
responses that contain these target primes, regardless of their personal feelings of authorship. 
However, we obtained evidence for an agent priming effect in Experiments 3, in which the 
experimental prime word “God” was not seen in the measure of authorship attribution. This 
shows that there is more than semantic priming at work in these cases. 
Another issue with the interpretation of these data is whether our manipulation might 
have affected actual authorship of action, rather than just the feeling of doing. If we impacted 
actual authorship through these subliminal primes, making people faster or slower on the lexical 
decision tasks, it would seem only reasonable that the participants’ feelings of authorship be 
adjusted accordingly. However, the primes had no effect on either the participants’ response time 
or actual success at beating the computer. This suggests that the feeling of authorship can be 
relatively independent of actual authorship in these studies, or at least that there is more to the 
feeling of authorship than genuine authorship.  
It should be noted that there are potential boundary conditions for the effects we 
observed. Ambiguity is a prerequisite for the effects to occur. Someone who is fully convinced 
that a hurricane is caused by God (to punish a society), will probably not change his mind after 
being primed with an agent (God or other). However, the behavior participants performed in our 
experiments was not only ambiguous in terms of agency, but also relatively unimportant and 
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neither very positive nor very negative. The effects we obtained may be attenuated for behaviors 
that are very important and consequential, at least in part because such behavior is often (though 
not necessarily always) not ambiguous. In addition, the degree of positivity or negativity of 
ambiguous behavior may introduce a potential bias. We are inclined to attribute positive 
behavior more to the self, and negative behavior to external agents (e.g., Federoff and Harvey, 
1976). This implies that effects of agency priming will be attenuated for extremely positive or 
negative behavior, because there is less room to maneuver. If very positive behavior leads to a 
strong feeling that the self is doing it, activating the self subtly may make little difference. These 
are speculations though, and further research may address such potential moderators related to 
the kind of behavior under consideration.  
It is interesting to further scrutinize the findings of Experiment 3. We found that, among 
believers, priming God led to decreased experienced agency. The authorship processing view we 
propose can explain this finding with the assumption that heightened accessibility of an agents 
reduces the attribution to the default agent. In concrete terms, heightened accessibility of God 
reduced attribution of an action to the self, for believers at least. We would like to emphasize 
though, that we used the concept of “God” merely as a highly useful example of an external 
agent. The authorship processing view predicts that the effects can be generalized to other 
external agents.  
The null results found for nonbelievers on God primes points to the importance of the 
perceived efficacy of a potential agent. It could have been the case that authorship processing is 
always consistent with any agent-relevant thoughts before action. For example, if I think about 
my Aunt Jean in Colorado before I bowl a strike in Connecticut, I could think she had done it, or 
if I look in the mirror before Ruud van Nistelrooij scores for Holland in the World Cup Soccer, I 
could think I had done it. Such attributions would not only be wrong, but completely absurd. 
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Agent-relevant thoughts that occur before action should impact authorship processing only if that 
agent is perceived to be capable of that action. Thus, thinking about myself before a winning 
goal could increase attributions to myself if I am a player in the game, but not if I am watching it 
on television. For the same reason, people who did not believe in God were not impacted by the 
God primes, because God was not believed to be an agent.  
The role of perceived agent efficacy could be examined in future studies. For example, if 
we had asked subjects about their attitudes on the omnipotence of God, we might have found that 
the effects were mediated by how powerful God was believed to be. In a similar vein, self-primes 
should have less authorship in those who have lower self-esteem, because these people should 
have less confidence in their own abilities. In fact, recent evidence points at this possibility. Self-
primes led to lower rather than higher feelings of agency among dysphoric participants (Aarts, 
Wegner & Dijksterhuis, 2006). 
 In addition to these general beliefs about the efficacy of various agents, a person may 
have a general tendency to perceive a particular agent as the most likely author, across many 
situations. For example, a person who had strong beliefs in God and His omnipotence could be 
more likely to judge Him to be responsible for actions (even in the absence of our subliminal 
primes). It seems likely that all people have some sort of agent framing that is their baseline in 
making authorship attributions. If the cues used in authorship processing are shortcuts to making 
these judgments, then agent framing is the map we use to draw those shortcuts.  
In activities that one is directly involved, (e.g. playing soccer game), the default agent 
frame may be the self. Research on locus of control has shown that people vary in the extent to 
which they perceive actions to be within their control, and the extent to which they are willing to 
make internal attributions for an outcome (Rotter, 1966; Seligman 1975). Indeed, the results 
from the present studies suggest that most people have a general tendency to attribute authorship 
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to the self when the self may be implicated; for all primes in all studies, attributions of authorship 
leaned more toward the self than the computer. However, the self is only one kind of agent frame 
that a person could use. The plane crash in Queens (NY) in November 2001 and the blackout in 
August 2003 that affected 50 million people in the United States and Canada had many people 
immediately thinking that terrorists had struck again. Many forms of paranoia also involve some 
agent frame, such as suspicions of government conspiracy or delusions of alien influence.  
Agent frames may vary between people, but they are only a baseline for authorship 
processing. If such cues become more frequent over time, we could expect that the agent frame 
might shift to a different baseline. Several personal failures can make a person less prone to 
attribute authorship to the self, and several successes could promote the tendency to attribute 
agency to the self. Evidence from this study points to the temporary malleability of those agent 
frames by external cues and new information, in particular that they are influenced by agent-
relevant thoughts, and are consistent with those thoughts.  
Conclusion 
The authorship of an action is not always clear, but several kinds of cues aid a person in 
judging who is responsible. In the present research, subliminal primes of the self before an action 
increased feelings of personal authorship for that action, subliminal primes of the competitor 
(computer) decreased feelings of own authorship, whereas subliminal priming of the inapplicable 
term Broccoli left felt authorship unaffected. When we extended the investigation to include 
supernatural agency, we found that subliminal primes of God decreased feelings of personal 
authorship, as had primes of the computer. However, this effect appeared only for those who 
believe in God. This is evidence that authorship attributions are influenced by agent-relevant 
thoughts, and are consistent with those thoughts, and that agent-relevant thoughts that a person 
has prior to action are one cue that is used during authorship processing. Genuine authorship for 
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an action may not always be clear, so we rely on our thoughts as clues to discerning the most 
likely actor.  
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Table 1 
Feelings of authorship as a function of prime and belief in Experiment 3 (standard deviations in 
parentheses). Means with different superscripts differ significantly.  
 
 
        Prime 
      Control   God    
 
Believers      3.63a   (1.30)   3.05b (1.42)  
 
Non-believers    3.72a (1.24)    4.01a (1.03)  
 
